Western New England Law Review
Volume 4 4 (1981-1982)
Issue 2

Article 2

1-1-1982

THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
Mark P. Widoff

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Mark P. Widoff, THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 223 (1982),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
MARK

P. WmOFF*

On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear
Power Plant in Pennsylvarua was the site of the first major nuclear
accident in the United States.! Fuel rods in reactor core unit 2
(TMI-2) inelted because of a coolant loss. The meltdown caused
highly radioactive fission byproducts and uranium pellets to be re
leased into the water coolant system and into the atmosphere. 2 The
public concern over the TMI accident, however, was not confined to
the immediate area surrounding the nuclear power plant. National
concern over the safety of nuclear power developed because the
builder of the damaged TMI-2 and the undamaged TMI unit I
(TMI-I), Babcock and Wilcox, had built several plants in different
locations around the country. 3
It is too early to determine whether the TMI accident will con
tribute to the eventual decline in the use of nuclear fission as a means
of generating electricity or whether it will prompt greater achieve
ment within the industry. Nevertheless, this paper draws some ten
tative conclusions from the developments to date.
I.

FINANCIAL RAMIFICATIONS

The financial ramifications of a major nuclear reactor accident
are so severe that it is practically impossible for even the largest elec
tric utility company to bear them. 4 Thus, if the industry is to survive,
individual companies will have to obtain more extensive insurance
• Partner in the law firm of Widoff, Reager, Selkowitz and Adler, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. Formerly the Consumer Advocate for the Commonwealth of Penn
sylvania. B.A., Clark University, 1963; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1966.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
2. Id, Mar. 30, 1979, § 4, at 22, col. 3.
3. Id For example, California Governor Brown asked the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission [hereinafter referred to as NRC) to shut down temporarily the Rancho Seco
nuclear power plant, built by Babcock and Wilcox, because he was concerned with po
tential generic defects in the plant. Id, Apr. 2, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
4. See notes 105-12 infra and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
financial impact of the TMI accident on General Public Utilities [hereinafter referred to
as GPU]. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1981, § 4 (Business Day), at 1, col. 1, for an
overview of GPU's financial woes after the TMI accident.
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protection than previously was thought necessary. Industry survival
also depends on a full-scale review of the Atomic Energy Damages
Act, also known as the Price-Anderson Act,S which imposes limits on
liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of feder
ally licensed, private nuclear power plants.
The electric utility industry's concern is illustrated by the costs
incurred as a result of the TMI accident. The $300 million property
damage insurance coverage on TMI-2 will be inadequate to repair
the damage and to restart or dismantle the reactor. 6 The owners of
TMI-2, General Public Utilities (GPU), estimate that their cleanup
and restart costs will exceed $1 billion7 and will extend over a period
of six to eight years. 8 The regulatory commissions in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, the states served by the reactor, have indicated an
unwillingness to allow GPU to pass these costs on to its customers. 9
GPU, therefore, is seeking financial assistance from the federal gov
ernment to cover its uninsured liability.lO Further, GPU has lost
money on its original investment of nearly $1 billion expended for
the construction ofTMI-l and TMI-2," because the regulatory com
missions have been unwilling to allow GPU to exact a return from
its customers for plants that are not producing electricity.12 Since
utility.companies will be unwilling and unable to face such financial
risks in the future,13 insurance protection under Price-Anderson
must be reevaluated, particularly the unrealistically low $500 million
limit on liability coverage for injury due to nuclear accident. 14
Because production at both TMI-I and TMI-2 ceased after the
5. The Atomic Energy Damages Act [hereinafter referred to as Price-Anderson
Act) is codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2210 (1976). The United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court stated that Congress' intent to encourage
private participation in the development and exploitation of nuclear energy was ample
justification for treating persons injured in a nuclear accident differently from those in
jured by other causes. Id at 93.
6. N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at ll, col. 1.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id. See notes 92-109 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of state regu
latory response.
10. Id See generally Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-75 (West Supp. 1980) for an example of federal bailout of a private
corporation.
11. GPU has declared its original investment in TMI, including fuel, to be $780
million. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1979, § I, at 16, col. 1.
12. See notes 99-115 infra and accompanying text.
13. See N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at I, col. 3.
14. 42 U.S.c.A. § 221O(c) (West Supp. 1980).
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accident,IS GPU has had to purchase power on the grid l6 at an enor
mous cost,l1 The Pennsylvania and New Jersey regulatory commis
sions, however, were willing to pass these repurchase costs along to
GPU customers. IS
The TMI accident also has forced both the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the industry to revise their views on the
kinds of protection needed to avoid major accidents in the future.
The NRC and the industry underestimated the potential for serious
nuclear accidents prior to the TMI accident and had no plan to deal
with such situations. "Class 9" accidents, 19 the most serious kind, no
longer will be dismissed as improbable. Thus, expensive retrofit
ting20 and redesigning, evacuation and communication plans, and
legal efforts have begun. 21 These additional expenditures for new
plans and the unprecedented cost of borrowing money have discour
aged new construction.·
The decision to cancel or forgo new orders has become an eco
nomic necessity for most pronuclear utilities. 22 Consequently, the
revitalization of nuclear industry urged by President Reagan23 will
take place only with federal assistance. Thus, the financial impact of
the TMI accident on utility company planners is significant.
While the effects of the accident on health will not be known for
many years, the newly perceived risk of a major accident already is
having a profound impact on the nuclear power option. If nuclear
power can be made safe only at a prohibitive cost, it ceases to be a
15. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., [1979] 29
PuB. U. REp. (PUR 4th) 502, 507.
16. This article uses the phrase "purchasing power on the grid" to refer to the
procedure of buying surplus electricity generated by other utility companies.
17. See, e.g. , Grygiel & Zarillo, Three Mile Island· The New Jersey Regulatory Re
sponse, 106 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 13, 24-25 (1980).
18. See notes 99-115 infra and accompanying text.
19. See In re Offshore Power Systems, 8 NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 194,
209-10 (1978) for a discussion of "Class 9" accidents.
20. Retrofitting involves furnishing a reactor with new equipment that had been
unavailable at the time of original manufacture. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1940 (1976).
21. See generally Statement of Policy: Further Commission Guidance for Power Re
actor Operating Licenses, 12 NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 654, 650-61 (1980).
22. For example, GPU has announced the cancellation of the Forked Rivers Nu
clear Project in New Jersey. N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at II, col. 1. Four hundred mil
lion dollars had been spent on the facility. Id
23. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § I, at I, col. 5, for a discussion of the draft of
the Reagan Administration's nuclear energy policy that expressed an intention "to re
move governmental barriers to the wider use of nuclear energy." Id
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viable energy option. 24 A general overview of the various lawsuits
filed in the wake of the TMI accident follows. This article does not
attempt to analyze any particular case in detail. Rather, it seeks to
alert the reader to the general thrust of the TMI litigation, for each
suit has a far-reaching financial impact on the nuclear power
industry.
II.

CIVIL LIABILITY

Shortly after the TMI accident, individual and class action suits
were filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania against the owners, operators, designers, construc
tors, and maintainers ofTMI. Eventually, these actions were consol
idated into one class action suit, In re Three Mile Island Litigation
(TMI).25
A.

Class Action Status

Three separate classes were alleged in this tort action. 26 The
first two have been certified by the court.27 Class I, which consists of
business entities within a twenty-five mile radius of TMI, claims
damage to ongoing business operations. 28 Substantial disruption of
business activity occurred for several days following the accident. 29
If liability is established, damages, such as lost profits, will be rea
sonably easy to establish in the usual manner. 30
Class II, which consists of natural persons within a twenty-five
mile radius of TMI, claims damages relating to evacuation expenses,
loss of wages, and loss of value to real property due to the TMI acci
24. For further information on the financial consequences of the accident, see
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, THREE MILE ISLAND: THE FINAN
CIAL FALLOUT (1980). For evaluations of the precarious financial condition of the corpo
rate owners ofTMI and the very real threat of bankruptcy, see N.Y. Times, supra note 4,
at 11, col. 1.
25. 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980). The procedural matters arising from the sev
eral actions were first heard by John Havas, Magistrate, United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His findings and recommendations are found in
Report of Magistrate, In re Three Mile Island, No. 79-432 (M.D. Pa., Jan. 24, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Report of Magistrate).
26. 87 F.R.D. at 435. Certification, or denial thereof, was based on the recommen
dations of Magistrate Havas. Id at 434. See notes 28-36 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the magistrate's recommendations and Judge Rambo's decision on
each class.
27. 87 F.R.D. at 438-40.
28. Id at 435.
29. See N.Y. Times, supra note 11, at 14, col. 5.
30. See 22 AM. JUR. 2d. Damages §§ 175-178 (1965).
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dent and its aftermath. 3! It is estimated that 636,000 people live
within the twenty-mile radius and that a significant percentage were
evacuated.32 If less than one-half of this estimated number were
evacuated at a hypothetical cost per person of $lOO, the evacuation
costs alone would involve a claim of $30 million.
Class III consists of those who suffered personal injury or emo
tional distress, those who are threatened with personal injury or
emotional distress, and those who will require medical detection
services because of possible exposure to radiation. 33 This class
claims damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other
injury.34 In a memorandum opinion and order dated July lO, 1980,
Judge Sylvia H. Rambo refused to certify this class because, under
the circumstances, there could be no "finding that 'a class action
[would be] superior to other available methods for the fair and effi
cient adjudication of the controversy.' "35
B.

Relationship of State and Federal Law

While TMI is a tort action composed of claims for recovery
based on Pennsylvania tort law,36 federal statutory law will have an
important role in the litigation. Pennsylvania law will define de
fendants' standard of care,37 but the Federal Atomic Energy Act of
195438 and Price-Anderson are crucial to the jurisdiction of the
31. 87 F.R.D. at 435.
32. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1979, § 2, at 14, col. 1.
33. 87 F.R.D. at 435.
34. Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 2.
35. 87 F.R.D. at 441 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3». Judge Rambo asserted
that "the causation element of plaintilrs physical injury/emotional distress claims will
require individual proof. In effect, the class action would break up into separate suits."
Id at 44142. For example, one Class III deponant claimed that she secured an abortion
because she feared the effects ofTMI's radiation and that she suffered physical and emo
tional injury. Id at 44041. Another claimed the TMI accident had caused her such
emotional stress that she developed high blood pressure. Id at 441. The final Class III
deponant claimed her family had suffered minor illnesses such as diarrhea and nausea.
Id
36. Magistrate Havas stated that the legislative history of Price-Anderson shows
that the Act "'permits retention of State law with respect to the cause of action and the
measure ofdamages. ,,, Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 31 (emphasis in original)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Congo 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3201, 3209).
37. See, e.g., Richard V. Kaufman, 47 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (constru
ing Pennsylvania law as requiring strict liability in tort for the pursuit of ultrahazardous
activities); Mazza V. Berlanti Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, 509, 214 A.2d 257, 259
(1965) (application of strict liability in Pennsylvania does not remove the necessity of
proving foreseeability of damages and causation).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976).
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court. These federal statutes also affect the resolution of many pro
cedural and substantive issues that have arisen or will arise in the
case. For example, Price-Anderson imposes an absolute limit of
$560 million on the amount of damages that can be assessed against
defendants. 39 The federal statutory scheme significantly affects the
nature of TMI, even though the actions are grounded in Penn
sylvania law. The practical impact of Price-Anderson, however, may
be mitigated by Pennsylvania's common-law tort principles. 40
The NRC has determined that the accident was not an "Ex
traordinary Nuclear Occurrence" (ENO)41 within the meaning of
Price-Anderson.42 Such a determination is called a "negative
ENO"43 and is helpful to defendants, for when ENO is found de
fendants are deemed to have waived the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and charitable or governmental
immunity.44 In addition, defendants are deemed to have waived
statutes of limitations when the claimant instituted the suit ''within
three years from the date on which [he) first knew, or reasonably
could have known, of his injury or damage and cause thereof, but in
no event more than twenty years after the date of the nuclear
incident."4s
Ironically, the negative ENO determination in TMI may prove
beneficial to plaintiffs. The defenses that would have been waived
probably were available under Pennsylvania strict liability standards
for ultrahazardous activities. 46 Moreover, according to the United
States Magistrate's Report on January 24, 1980, defendants appeared
39. Id § 221O(e). It is extremely difficult to say whether the $560 million liability
ceiling of Price-Anderson will create problems in this case. While the damages that
Classes I and II are likely to recover appear to be substantial, the $560 million limit may
be adequate unless a breakthrough of some sort is made by a Class III claimant. The
property damage insurance covering the plant was grossly inadequate, and the $560 mil
lion limit would have been seriously deficient had the circumstances been slightly differ
ent. At present, it is unclear whether liability will exceed the limit.
40. Magistrate Havas, paraphrasing S. REp. No. 1605, supra note 36, reprinted in
[1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3201, 3209, stated "Price-Anderson 'is not a meas
ure designed. . . to accomplish a general revision of American tort law. . . .' Thus,
Price-Anderson can nol be viewed as particularly easing a claimant's burden in respect to
the traditional tort issues of causation, foreseeability and damages . . . ." Report of
Magistrate, supra note 25, at 31 (emphasis added).
41. In re Metropolitan Edison Co., 11 NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 519,
521 (1980).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 22l0(n)(1) (1976).
43. Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 11.
44. Id
45. 42 U.S.C. § 22l0(n)(1)(iii) (1976).
46. Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 11.
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ready to concede that their actions caused the accident. 47 Thus, con
tributory negligence was not an issue.48 Finally, the Pennsylvania
statute of limitations49 for latent injury appears more permissive
than the Price-Anderson limit. 50 The negative ENO ruling then, al
though beneficial to defendants, is not harmful to plaintiffs.
C. Individual Lawsuits hy Class III Plaint!IJs
Several plaintiffs in TMI, and perhaps other individuals, un
doubtedly will press their Class III personal injury or emotional dis
tress claims individually, as the class has not been certified.
Coincidentally, Pennsylvania recently announced recognition of the
tort of negligent infliction of mental distress. 5 1 Substantial data on
the psychological impact of the accident has been collected and al
legedly verifies that the accident had tremendous emotional impact
on large numbers of people. 52
.
If these Class III claims are pressed, several difficult and chal
lenging legal issues are likely to arise. In a report that does not yet
reflect the opinion of the court, United States Magistrate John Havas
has acknowledged the emotional problems suffered by individuals
living near the reactor:
In considering the significant aspects of the emotional distress
claims in this case relative to the certification question at hand one
is struck by the uniqueness of this case. Radiation cannot be per
ceived by the senses, and for that matter, as conceded by Defend
ants . . . , "low-level exposures to it do not necessarily leave
detectable traces . . . ." However, the imperceivable and un
known qualities of radiation only make it all the more
frightening. 53
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5524(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981) contains a two-year stat
ute of limitations for personal injury cases. The action, however, does not accrue until
the injury and the cause thereof is known or reasonably ascertainable. See Bayless v.
Philadelphia Nat'l League Club, 579 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1978).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 221O(n)(I) (1976).
51. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 172-73,404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979).
52. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIOR IM
PACT OF THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR INCIDENT (1980)(two parts)(prepared by
Peter Hautsth of the Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine).
53. Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 37 (quoting Brief for Defendant at 13,
In re Three Mile Island, No. 79-432 (M.D. Pa., Jan. 24, 1980». The magistrate based his
observations concerning the fear of radiation on the Kemeny Report which cautioned: .
[I]t is vitally important to remember the fear with respect to nuclear energy that
exists in many human beings. The first application of nuclear energy was to
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In addition to the emotional impact from imperceivable nuclear
radiation, the magistrate found that two additional factors could af
fect Class III plaintiffs. First, the residents surrounding TMI could
not be expected to comprehend fully the precise dangers stemming
from the TMI accident. 54 Even the NRC and Metropolitan Edison
did not comprehend the potential danger posed by the TMI acci
dent. 55 Accordingly, the degree of confusion present at the time of
the accident tends to magnify the already substantial fears exper
ienced by many Class III plaintiffs. The confusion factor presuma
bly bodes well for plaintiffs regarding damages. Conversely, the
residents surrounding TMI had time for "reflection, decision and
study"56 as the accident unfolded. This factor militates against
plaintiffs, as the traditional mental distress cases have involved sud
den and traumatic events such as an "onrushing bull or car."57 The
reflection factor, however, should not impede recovery because the
occurrence of the nuclear accident itself was unprecedented.
With the denial of certification of Class III plaintiffs, TMI was
reduced to a class action wherein claims could be measured in mone
tary terms. 58 TMI thus may have a formidable impact on those ar
eas of tort law. Consequently, the outcome will not pass unnoticed
by potential planners and investors in a beleaguered nuclear power
industry.
The ramifications of TMI, however, extend beyond the
financial well-being of the nuclear industry. The TMI accident
called into question the basic assumption of those who support nu
clear energy that serious nuclear accidents were practically impossi
ble. TMI demonstrated that nuclear accidents are a reality. The
accident also has raised doubt as to the ability of the NRC to ade
quately oversee the safety of the nuclear industry. Finally, the acci
dent may affect the public desire for nuclear energy, especially in the
minds of those who reside near nuclear power plants.
atomic bombs which destroyed two major Japanese cities. The fear of radiation
has been with us ever since and is made worse by the fact that, unlike floods or
tornadoes, we can neither hear nor smell radiation.
KEMENY REpORT, infra note 81, at 19.
54. Report of Magistrate, supra note 25, at 38.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. See 87 F.R.D. at 439 ("[cJlaims for business losses, depreciation in real estate
value, and evacuation related expenses will be typical of the claims of Classes I and II.").
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FEDERAL HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION

Judicial .Developments

Several suits against the federal government for failure to up
hold its duty to regulate the nuclear power industry so as to protect
the public health and safety have resulted from the TMI accident. 59
Shortly after the accident, a group of citizens living in the Lan
caster, Pennsylvania area filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to enjoin TMI from
discharging any of the million gallons of radioactive water stored at
the TMI plant into the Susquehana River, the area's source of drink
ing water. 60 In Susquehana Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nu
clear Reactor,61 these private citizens alleged that the actions and
inactions of the NRC and the plant's operators violated the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954,62 the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA),63 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA),64 and various provisions of the United States Constitu
tion. According to the district court, the declaratory and injunctive
relief sought by plaintiffs was available only from the NRC. 65 The
court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
before the NRC.66
In an opinion that will have a significant impact on the ability
of affected parties to challenge actions67 by regulated industries and
the NRC, the Third Circuit reversed the district court. The Third
Circuit agreed with the lower court's ruling that private litigants
were precluded from suing to enforce the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act. 68 The court, however, held that the complaint stated a
cause of action within the federal question jurisdiction of the district
court under NEPA and the FWPCA.69 The court carefully pointed
59. See notes 60-77 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of two suits that
promise to have a significant impact on regulation of the nuclear industry.
60. 485 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa. 1979),ojJ'dinparrondrev'dinporl, 619 F.2d 231 (3d
Cir. 1980), cerro denied, WI S. Ct. 893 (1981).
61. Id at 83.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976).
63. Id §§ 4321-4361.
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
65. 485 F. Supp. at 87-88 ..
66. Id
67. Another case raising issues relating to discharge of radioactive water has been
settled. City of Lancaster v. NRC, No. 79-1363 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, I 980).
68. 619 F.2d 231, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1980), cerro denied, WI S. Ct. 893 (1981).
69. Id at 241,244. In addition, the court concluded that the district court, not the
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out that the judicially created "exhaustion of administrative reme
dies" doctrine does not affect the threshold issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.70
Rather, the doctrine affects the timing of the claim for relief.71 Un
less Congress relegates matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of an ad
ministrative agency, those matters are within the subject matter of
the federal district court.72 The affected citizens, therefore, may util
ize the district court as the appropriate forum for challenging the
proper application and enforcement of the federal environmental
acts.73
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia, in Sholly v. United States Nue/ear Regulatory Commission, 74 ren
dered an opinion that should increase the ability of intervenors to
challenge proposed actions affecting the environment. In Sholly, de
fendant NRC, without holding a public hearing, allowed radioactive
krypton gas to be released into the air. 75 Congress, through the
Atomic Energy Act, gave affected citizens the right to a hearing
before the NRC for a broad range of matters.16 Nevertheless, the
NRC failed to hold the requested hearings prior to the venting of the
radioactive gas. The court held that the NRC had violated section
189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act by permitting the gas to be vented
prior to the requested hearings. 77 Sholly thus affords intervenors yet
another means to protect themselves against arbitrary or untimely
NRC decisions that threaten to affect the environment adversely.
B. Administrative .Developments

At the publication date of this article, the issue of whether the
undamaged TMI-I should be allowed to resume operations has been
pending in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the NRC for
over two years. 78 The NRC hearing, in effect, is a review of MetroNRC, was the appropriate forum for presentation of a claim alleging that a discharge of
radioactive wastewater threatened to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id at 244
4S.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id at 24S.
73. Id
74. 6S1 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
7S. Id at 783.
76. "[Tlhe Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose
interest may be affected . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
77. 6S1 F.2d at 789.
78. See generally In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., [1980] 38 PuB. U.
REp. (pUR 4th) lIS, 120, (New Jersey Board of Public Utilities efforts to persuade the
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politan Edison's performance as a nuclear licensee. The NRC con
currently is conducting an evaluation of Metropolitan Edison and
GPU's reorganization plan. The plan includes improvements in
technical training for control room personnel, and improvements in
maintenance and repair procedures. 79
The hearings are particularly interesting because Metropolitan
Edison and GPU publicly announced that' the TMI accident was the
NRC's fault. 80 The utility companies allege that the NRC neglected
to warn of occurrences at other Babcock and Wilcox plants that were
similar to those that caused the TMI accident. 81 Metropolitan
Edison has filed a claim82 with the NRC for compensation of its bil
lions of dollars in accident losses. Undoubtedly, this claim will be
followed by litigation. Metropolitan Edison also has filed an action
against Babcock and Wilcox claiming that Babcock and Wilcox is
responsible for the accident. 83
Several billions of dollars are at stake in these lawsuits. More
over, Metropolitan Edison customers and GPU shareholders will
bear a heavy financial burden because of the bureaucratic mistakes
of GPU, Babcock and Wilcox, and the NRC. The groups that ulti
mately will assume liability for the accident, Metropolitan Edison
customers, GPU shareholders, and, perhaps, United States taxpay
ers,84 are innocent. The customers and G PU shareholders, are inno
cent. The bureaucrats, however, are functioning normally while
pointing fingers at each other in an effort to divert public attention
and financial responsibility.85
Regardless of the liability issue, restarting TMI-I is crucial to
NRC to return TMI-I to service). See also Springfield (Mass.) Morning Union, Dec. 22,
1981, at 6, col. 1.
79. See In re Metropolitan Edison Co., II NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 408
(1980).
80. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1981, § I, at 13, col. 1. Metropolitan Edison is the GPU
subsidiary which operates TMI.
81. Id See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE IS
LAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
KEMENY REpORT).
82. A formal demand is mandated by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.c.
§ 2675(a) (1976).
83. N.Y. Times, supra note 80. GPU alleged that Babcock and Wilcox "failed to
provide information on reactor problems." Id
84. In spite of all this litigation, this author expects United States taxpayers ulti
mately to assume financial responsibility for the accident since the private industries in
volved cannot tolerate such a financial drain. But see Dim Bailout Hopes for General
Public Utilities, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 23, 1981, at 43.
85. For a discussion of the accident and the roles of the various parties affected by
it, see NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, THREE MILE ISLAND REPORT
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the financial well-being of Metropolitan Edison and GPU. 86 The
owners of TMI-I are losing revenue on their capital investment.
They also are purchasing replacement power at great costs. Those
costs could be cut substantially by restarting TMI-1. 87 Local and
national citizen and antinuclear groups, on the other hand, are fight
ing the restart on safety and public health grounds, emphasizing the
adverse psychological impact a restart would create. 88
In an important two-to-two decision, the NRC refused to permit
the issue of psychological damage to TMI residen.ts to be included
within the health and safety issues considered by the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board. 89 This decision resulted in spite of the Board's
recommendation to the contrary.90 The NRC excluded the psycho
logical damage issue, for allowing the issue would have exceeded the
agency's statutory authority.91 The NRC's determination certainly
will be reviewed by the appellate courts, as an argument to terminate
nuclear production of electricity at TMI probably would not succeed
without addressing the fundamental issue of psychological stress. 92
TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND THE PUBLIC (1980) [hereinafter cited as ROGAVIN REPORT).
See also KEMENY REpORT, supra note 81.
86. See generally N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at II, col. 2, in which a GPU spokes
man is quoted as having stated that the utility" 'has been essentially stripped of its earn
ing power' " because, among several factors, TMI-I will not be allowed to restart until
safety modifications are completed. Id (quoting Edward J. Halcombe, Vice President of
GPU).
87. See generally N.Y. Times, May 23, 1981, § 4 (Business Day), at 30, col. 5 (an
nouncement by GPU of a long term power purchase agreement with a coal-fired Cana
dian generating station in Windsor, Ontario, to replace power lost by the TMI
shutdown).
88. See, e.g., In re Metropolitan Edison Co., 12 NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N Issu
ANCES 607, 613 (1980) (Hendrie, Comm'r), in which intervenor People Against Nuclear
Energy (PANE) asserted that the NRC is required to consider the issue of psychological
stress in its licensing proceedings..
89. Id. at 608.
90. In re Metropolitan Edison Co., II NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 297
(1980) (Certification to the Commission on Psychological Distress Issues, Special
Proceeding).
91. In re Metropolitan Edison Co., 12 NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N ISSUANCES 607,
613 (1980) (Hendrie, Comm'r).
92. But see id at 621 (Bradford, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Bradford
noted:
[It) is unlikely that the reopening of TMI-I could hinge on the psychological
stress contentions as framed here. I say this because none of the governmental
entities that should be most knowledgable of a stress situation requiring perma
nent closure of TMI-l are presenting such contentions . . .. If the state and
local entities do not feel that the stress issue warrants their involvement, it will
be hard to avoid the conclusion that stress and its consequences are not of such
overriding importance to the populace as a whole as to preclude operation of
the plant.
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Many TMI-area residents experienced emotional upheaval during,
and after, the accident. 93 The psychological impact of a restart un
doubtedly would be substantial, but the NRC will decide if it is sub
stantial enough to warrant consideration as part of the health and
safety issue before the NRC.
The TMI accident has had, and will continue to have, a
profound impact on federal health and safety regulation. 94 The de
velopments surrounding the changing powers of the NRC illustrate
this impact. First, Susquehanna Valley Alliance 9s and Shol!y96 have
made intervenors more effective in challenging the decisions made
by the NRC or by any administrative or regulatory agency. Second,
charges by Metropolitan Edison against the NRC have questioned
the NRC's competency to regulate the industry.97 Finally, the citi
zens' fight against TMI to forestall restart operations may help to
redefine the NRC's authority under its enabling act. 98 Thus, the
TMI accident triggered a movement toward a more effective health
and safety regulatory scheme and a more accountable NRC.
IV.

STATE UTILITY REGULATION

The TMI accident has had a great impact on the development
of public utility law on the state level. Faced with unprecedented
regulatory problems caused by the outages of TMI-I and TMI-2,
two major electrical generating stations, the utility regulatory com
missions in Pennsylvania and New Jersey have had to face a number
of difficult issues. These included: (1) Whether to continue to in
clude TMI units in their rate base so that the owner, GPU, could
Id
93. See 87 F.R.D. at 440-41.
94. For reconimendations regarding regulatory reform and for observations on the
reasons for the TMI accident, see KEMENY REPORT, supra note 81; ROGAVIN REPORT,
supra note 85. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. NRC, 600 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979)
(ligitation raising TMI related health and safety issues).
95. 619 F.2d at 246 (discouraging the granting of motions to dismiss under FED. R.
CIY. P. 12 despite the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies).
96. 651 F.2d at 787 (dismissing the theory that by a finding of "no significant
hazards" the NRC may dispense with the hearing requirement).
97. See generally In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., [1981] 38 PUB. U.
REp. (PUR 4th) 115, in which the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities stated that inves
tigations "clearly establish that the cause of the accident at TMI was not solely limited to
operator error but, in fact, was in part related to the structure of nuclear regulation in
general" Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
98. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5841-5849 (West Supp. 1981). Reorg. Plan No.1 of 1980,
45 Fed. Reg. 40,561, reprinted in 94 Stat. 780 (1980), is a response to the ''need for more
effective management of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5841
(West Supp. 1981).
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continue to realize a return on its $1 billion investment;99 (2) whether
to increase GPU's rates to cover the cost of expensive replacement
power purchased from other utility companies;IOO (3) whether to in
crease rates to cover the cost for cleanup of the radioactive contami
nated plant; 101 (4) the potential bankruptcy of the owners of the
plant and its subsidiaries; 102 and (5) the managerial responsibility
and accountability of a regulated utility company for the TMI acci
dent. 103 The New Jersey and Pennsylvania commissions thus far
have dealt with the issues in similar ways. While utility consumers
frequently assume the financial risks for minor accidents or power
outages, both state commissions steadfastly have refused to make
TMI customers insurers for the enormous economic damages caused
by the accident. Instead, the commissions have devised a compro
mise scheme that takes into consideration both the financial detri
ment to TMI's owners and the innocence of the ratepayers. 104 First,
TMI-l and TMI-2 have been removed from the rate base of the
companies on the grounds that the two facilities are not "used and
useful" as required by law.105 The decision has resulted in cata
strophic losses for GPU.l06 Lowering the rate base eliminated earn
ings the companies otherwise would have made on their investment.
These downward rate adjustments were made because both commis
sions believed that it would be inequitable to require consumers to
pay both for purchased power costs made necessary by the accident
and for the carrying charges, or return on investment, of inactive
plants no longer producing electricity.107 The significance of these
precedents should not be underestimated. The commissions are
99. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1979) 29 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR 4th) 502, 507; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 13,25-26.
100. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1979) 29 PuB.
.
U. REP. (pUR 4th) 502, 504; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 24.
101. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1979) 29 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR 4th) 502, 505.
102. Id; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 27.
103. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1979) 29 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR 4th) 502, 515; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 26-27.
104. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1979)29 PuB.
U. REp. (PUR 4TH) 502, 507. See also Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., (1981)37 PUB. U. REP. (PUR 4th) 77. For an excellent summary of the New
Jersey response to the Pennsylvania rate scheme, see Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17.
105. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1981)37 PuB.
U. REP. (PUR 4th) 77, 85-89; Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., (1979) PuB. U. REp. (PUR 4th) 502, 507.
106. See N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at I, col. 1.
107. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1981) 37 PuB.
U. REp. (pUR 4th) 77, 89; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra notd7, at 24.
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sending a clear message to the financial markets that the financial
risks of a nuclear accident are significantly greater than previously
thought. As previously indicated,108 the effects of nuclear accidents
on the financial future of nuclear construction are considerable. 109
Second, both commissions have agreed to pass on to customers
the huge cost of purchased power, necessitated by the extended out
ages of TMI-l and TMI-2.11O Due to GPU's severe cash flow
problems, collection of these amounts from GPU's customers has
been accelerated.
Third, the Pennsylvania commission has expressed its view that
the ratepayers should not bear the cleanup costs of TMI-2. As the
maximum property damage insurance coverage is $300 million, and
as present estimates of cleanup costs exceed $1 billion, both regula
tory commissions and GPU have begun to lobby heavily for federal
aid as a substitute for ratepayer contributions. 1I1 GPU's financial
condition is so precarious that it is unlikely it could raise the neces
sary funds to continue the cleanup without some form of federal aid
or large customer rate increases. I 12
Fourth, both commissions have expressed the view that bank
ruptcy of GPU and its subsidiaries is not desirable. ll3 If G PU were
to go out of business, TMI cleanup expenses merely would shift to
some other entity and another utility company would have to assume
responsibility for providing electric service. The possibility of sepa
rating the cleanup function from the provision of electric service
continues to be discussed. I 14
108. See notes 4-24 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the financial
impact of the TMI accident.
109. See Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 27-28. See also The Costs of Nue/ear
Accidents and Ahandonments in Rate Making, 104 PuB. UTiL. FORT. 17 (1979); Three
Mile Island-The Regulatory Challenge of 1979, 104 PuB. UTIL. FORT. IS (1979).
110. In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., [1981)38 PuB. U. REP. (PUR 4th)
liS, 121; Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., [1979)29 PUB. U.
REp. (pUR 4th) 502, 508.
Ill. In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., [1981)38 PuB. U. REP. (PUR 4th)
115, 120; Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1981)37 PUB. U.
REp. (PUR 4th) 77, 83.
112. See In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., (1981)38 PuB. U. REp. (PUR
4th) 115, 117, for the finding by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities that "GPU, in
its present financial condition, cannot sell common equity at a reasonable price." Id.
The Board also found that GPU's wholly owned New Jersey subsidiary did not have
"sufficient coverages to sell long term debt" or preferred stock. Id.
113. In re New Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., [1981)38 PuB. U. REP. (PUR 4th)
liS, 117; Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., (1981)37 PUB. U.
REp. (pUR 4th) 77, 80-81.
114. See Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, for a discussion of the distinction be
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Finally, the commissions of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, as
well as the NRC, are reviewing GPU's technical and managerial
performance to identify areas in need of improvement. I 15

v.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear technology is an unforgiving science. The ramifications
of human error, negligence, or incompetence are so great that an
other accident would end, or at the very least seriously disrupt, the
present experiment with large-scale use of nuclear power to generate
electricity. Nuclear energy production is fraught with danger. As no
significant market forces operate in the world of the public utility
monopoly, 116 the government must monitor the nuclear industry and
must maintain the highest standards of accountability within the
industry.
As the foregoing summary of lawsuits arising from the March
28, 1979, TMI accident illustrates, the ramifications of America's
.worst commercial reactor incident are broad and significant. The
law reacts slowly to society's changing values. It thus remains to be
seen whether the TMI lawsuits or the regulations and legislation
promulgated since the accident will retlect a dramatic shift in the
way the law will deal with future nuclear power problems. As sug
gested, however, the financial consequences of the accident are se
vere and these financial realities alone undoubtedly will determine
the fate of our national effort to produce nuclear power.

tween the cleanup operation and the provision of electrical service. See generally sources
cited note 24 supra.
115. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., [1979] 29 PUB.
U. REP. (PUR 4th) 502, 515-16; Grygiel & Zarillo, supra note 17, at 27.
116. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 239 (1977) for a discussion of regulated in
dustries, including public utilities.

